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COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT MARKETS 
 
Shyamkrishna Balganesh† 
 
Should copyright infringement claims be treated as marketable assets? 
Copyright law has long emphasized the free and independent alienability of 
its exclusive rights. Yet, the right to sue for infringement—that copyright law 
simultaneously grants authors in order to render its exclusive rights 
operational—has never been thought of as independently assignable, or 
indeed as the target of investments by third parties. As a result, discussions 
of copyright law and policy rarely ever consider the possibility of an 
acquisition or investment market emerging for actionable copyright claims, 
and the advantages that such a market might hold for copyright’s goals, 
objectives and functioning. This Essay analyzes the opportunities and 
challenges presented by an independent market for copyright claims, and 
argues that copyright law, policy, and practice would stand to benefit from 
the regulated involvement of third parties in acquiring, financing, bringing, 
and defending infringement claims. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 The phenomenon of third parties acquiring, financing, or investing in 
private litigation has begun to see a sharp increase in the last few years.1 Large 
commercial disputes, previously thought to be immune to any third party 
involvement, are today the principal targets for such involvement. In the 
process, rather robust claim markets have begun to emerge in various 
substantive areas.2 Despite this general trend though, the copyright system 
remains resistant to the role of third parties in acquiring and bringing 
infringement claims. The perceived one-sidedness of the system, which favors 
large commercial enterprises at the cost of individual user-defendants, and the 
general tendency among defendants to avoid litigating the question of fair use 
are together thought to render copyright litigation something of an evil that 
ought to be avoided unless absolutely necessary.3 Allowing third parties to 
bring claims independently is, in this climate, seen as anathema. Copyright law 
thus contains stringent rules of standing that courts all too readily invoke and 
extend, in order to keep third parties out of the system.4 
 This tendency to view copyright litigation as an active hindrance that 
needs to be curbed has only been exacerbated by the recent public outcry 
against “copyright trolls”, which are seen as entities that seek to profit from 
litigation by monetizing it.5 While the disquiet originated in the palpably 
problematic context of entities that merely sought to take advantage of 
                                                            
1 See, e.g., Maya Steinitz, Whose Claim is this Anyway? Third Party Litigation Funding, 95 MINN. L. 
REV. 1268, 1275-86 (2011); Jason Lyon, Comment, Revolution in Progress: Third-Party Funding of 
American Litigation, 58 UCLA L. REV. 571, 577 (2010); Jonathan T. Molot, Litigation Finance: A 
Market Solution to a Procedural Problem, 99 GEO. L.J. 65, 90 (2010).  
2 See Steinitz, supra note __, at 1277. 
3 For an analysis of how this affects the behavior of litigants, see Jennifer E. Rothman, The Questionable 
Use of Custom in Intellectual Property, 93 VA. L. REV. 1899, 1909-24 (2007) (describing practices that 
participants—primarily potential defendants—adopt in order to avoid costly copyright litigation). 
4 The rigidity originates in the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Silvers v. Sony Pictures, Inc., 402 F.3d 881 (9th 
Cir. 2005). See also 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §12.02 (2012). 
5 See, e.g., Copyright Trolls, EFF.ORG, https://www.eff.org/issues/copyright-trolls (last visited May 28, 
2012); Parker Higgins, Trouble in Trolltown: Judges Increasingly Catch On to Copyright Trolls’ Unfair 
Tactics, EFF.ORG, Apr. 14, 2012, https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/04/trouble-trolltown; Who Are 
Copyright Trolls?, FIGHT COPYRIGHT TROLLS, http://fightcopyrighttrolls.com/about/ (last visited May 29, 
2012); Mike Masnick, Rapidshare Countersues Perfect 10 For Being A 'Copyright Troll' Who Only 
'Shakes Down' Others, TECHDIRT, June 14, 2010, 
http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20100614/0105019802.shtml.  
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copyright’s statutory damages regime,6 it has since extended to just about any 
effort to profit from copyright litigation, regardless of the legitimacy or 
otherwise of the underlying claim itself. Copyright litigation is thus seen as 
deserving of avoidance, and third parties’ involvement therein is in turn 
viewed as doubly problematic and actively frowned upon. 
In this Essay, I argue that this approach is at once both myopic and 
counter-productive. Courts, scholars, and policy-makers have for far too long 
believed that meaningful reform in the copyright system needs to occur 
through copyright doctrine, be it at the legislative level or through judicial 
interpretation.7 In the process, they have ignored the possibility that market 
forces, if regulated and channeled appropriately, could do just as well and in 
certain respects perhaps even better than traditional law reform efforts. This is 
precisely what a regulated market for actionable copyright claims promises to 
do for copyright law. And contrary to popular belief, the increased 
involvement of third parties in the copyright system will inure to the benefit of 
both plaintiffs and defendants in copyright infringement actions. 
Copyright litigation today exhibits obvious malaises that litigation 
funding is well placed to correct. Litigating a copyright claim is no longer an 
affordable prospect for a vast majority of authors and creators. As of 2011, the 
average cost of litigating a copyright infringement case through trial, for either 
plaintiff or defendant—and excluding judgment and awards—was estimated to 
range from $384,000 to a staggering $2 million.8 To individual, small business, 
or non-commercial creators, all of who are intended beneficiaries of copyright, 
copyright litigation remains an unaffordable proposition. On the defendant 
side, users and copiers of creative works are for identical reasons, all too 
reluctant to defend themselves in court when threatened with an infringement 
lawsuit, and go to extreme lengths to avoid the risk of being sued, even when 
their actions are fully defensible under copyright’s fair use doctrine.9 Needless 
licenses, clearances, and permissions—which are expensive, but cost less than 
litigation—are today the norm among users and copiers, even when wholly 
unnecessary as a legal matter, and motivated entirely by the impulse to avoid 
costly litigation.  
The costs of copyright litigation thus have a distortionary effect on 
copyright law and policy. On the one hand, these costs hinder the system’s 
                                                            
6 See generally Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Uneasy Case Against Copyright Trolls, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 
(forthcoming May 2013). 
7 See, e.g., Jessica Litman, Real Copyright Reform, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1, 53-55 (2010) (noting that reform 
will have to come through the legislative process even though Congress is unlikely to undertake such 
reform efforts in the near future). 
8 AMER. INTELLECTUAL PROP. L. ASSOC’N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 2011, at 35 (2012). 
9 See PATRICIA AUFDERHEIDE & PETER JASZI, RECLAIMING FAIR USE (2011); James Gibson, Risk Aversion 
and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, 116 YALE L.J. 882, 887-906 (2007). 
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purported ability to function as an incentive for creativity.10 If creators and 
authors recognize that enforcing their copyright claims in court is an 
unworkable prospect (i.e., for cost reasons), copyright law’s ability to induce 
creative expression begins to automatically diminish. Simultaneously, the costs 
also render copyright law’s safety valves—such as the fair use doctrine, and 
other limitations and exceptions to exclusive rights—meaningless, with 
defendants rarely ever invoking them (given their dependence on a judicial 
determination), but instead actively undermining them through their litigation-
avoidance strategies.11  
Allowing third parties to enter copyright litigation, and acquire, fund, 
or insure infringement claims—in a regulated manner—presents copyright law 
with a plausible a solution. Their entry is likely to lower the cost of litigation 
for participants in the system, even if not in the abstract, in the process 
allowing both creators and users to focus more directly on their production and 
use of creative expression. In addition, their entry will also produce a host of 
indirect benefits for the copyright system, as seen and predicted in other 
substantive areas where their participation is permitted. Indeed, third party 
funding (and acquisition) of litigation claims has begun to gain prominence in 
jurisdictions around the world, principally because practice is believed to 
benefit litigants’ access to justice via courts—an expensive proposition—
without at the same time overwhelming the court system.12 
 In this Essay, I show how copyright law, practice, and theory would all 
stand to benefit from allowing third parties to fund infringement claims and 
defenses through diverse mechanisms and devices. Part I sets out the emerging 
practice of allowing third parties to acquire, fund, or invest in private legal 
claims and shows how the practice is altogether absent in copyright litigation. 
Part II makes the theoretical case for more third party involvement in copyright 
litigation. It analyzes how the copyright system embodies certain features that 
make it a viable target for claim markets, and shows how copyright law, 
practice, and policy are likely to benefit through the greater involvement of 
third party funding in copyright litigation. Part III then examines the possible 
mechanics of a market for copyright claims, and the forms in which third 
parties can be involved. It then details the obstacles that exist under current law 
and policy to the emergence of such a market, and changes that will need to be 
made to induce the greater participation of third parties in copyright litigation.  
  
I. THIRD PARTY LITIGATION FUNDING AND ITS ABSENCE 
 IN COPYRIGHT LITIGATION 
                                                            
10 For an overview of copyright’s dominant incentives rationale see Shyamkrishna Balganesh, 
Foreseeability and Copyright Incentives, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1569, 1570 (2009). 
11 See Gibson, supra note __, at 888-906. 
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 The practice of third parties involving themselves in private litigation—
also known as litigation funding—has seen a sharp increase in the law few 
years.13 The industry is still in its early stages in the U.S., but is predicted to 
grow rapidly in the next few years as courts, state legislatures, and local bar 
associations begin to relax the several restrictions that surround the practice.14  
 Litigation funding, broadly speaking, refers to the practice of 
“providing money to a party to pursue a potential or filed lawsuit.15” Put 
simply, “it is the provision of funds by companies who have no other 
connection with the litigation” other than in its outcome.16 Such funding can be 
on either the plaintiff or defendant side. In the former, it allows claims to be 
brought in court by providing in the necessary capital, and in the latter, it 
enables defendants to defend against claims without having to settle earlier 
than necessary for lack of funds, or owing to the uncertainty of litigation.17 
Recent estimates put the U.S. market for litigation funding at about $1 billion, 
and most predict that it is likely to grow rapidly in the next few years.18 
 As a practice through, litigation funding is hardly new to the U.S. Since 
at least the 1990s, lawyers and law firms provided clients, who needed to bring 
expensive lawsuits with loans, often at extremely high interest rates.19 Their 
focus was on individual plaintiffs bringing personal injury claims. Whereas 
these early practices were on a small scale, and largely ad hoc, the last few 
years have seen the entry of large investment firms into the practice.20 In 
addition to having significantly larger amounts of capital, these new entrants 
choose to invest in large commercial litigation (rather than personal injury 
                                                            
13 See, e.g., Binyamin Appelbaum, Investors Put Money on Lawsuits to Get Payouts, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
14, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/15/business/15lawsuit.html?pagewanted=print (describing 
this trend); Steinitz, supra note __, at 1275. 
14 RAND Institute for Civil Justice, supra note __, at 2; Appelbaum, supra note __. 
15 Nat’l Ass’n of Mutual Insurance Providers, Third Party Litigation Funding: Tipping the Scales of 
Justice for Profit, NAMIC Issue Analysis Paper, May 2011, 
http://www.namic.org/pdf/publicpolicy/1106_thirdPartyLitigation.pdf, at 1.  
16 Steinitz, supra note __, at 1276. 
17 Id. 
18 U.S. CHAMBER INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL REFORM, SELLING LAWSUITS, BUYING TROUBLE: THIRD PARTY 
LITIGATION FUNDING IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (2009), available at 
http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/sites/default/files/thirdpartylitigationfinancing.pdf (“Third-party 
litigation financing is a growing phenomenon in the United States.”);  Appelbaum, supra note __ (“Total 
investments in lawsuits at any given time now exceed $1 billion, several industry participants 
estimated.”). 
19 N.Y.C. Bar, Formal Op. 2011-02: Third-Party Litigation Financing, June 2011, 
http://www.nycbar.org/ethics/ethics-opinions-local/2011-opinions/1159-formal-opinion-2011-02 (“Third 
party litigation financing first emerged as an industry in the United States in the early 1990s, when a 
handful of small lenders began providing cash advances to plaintiffs involved in contingency fee 
litigation.”); Susan Lorde Martin, The Litigation Financing Industry: The Wild West of Finance Should 
be Tamed Not Outlawed, 10 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 55, 55 (2004). 
20 See Steinitz, supra note __, at 1277. 
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claims), involving corporate entities—either as plaintiff or defendant. The “the 
number and types of lawsuits financed” and indeed the “financing provided” 
have grown dramatically,21 causing some scholars to refer to this as the 
“second-wave” of litigation funding in the U.S.22 
 The impetus for this growth is often attributed to two reasons: 
international competitive pressures, and the rising cost of litigation. Other 
common law jurisdictions—mostly notably the U.K. and Australia—have 
come to actively encourage the practice, and put in place a host of regulations 
to allow claim markets to develop and grow there. In Australia, the practice 
was formally approved in 2006 by the High Court.23 U.K. courts soon followed 
suit, and in 2011 the U.K. adopted a Code of Conduct for Litigation Funders, 
to govern and regulate the practice.24 The exponential rise of civil litigation 
costs is well-known in the U.S.25 A recent estimate puts the cost of bringing a 
civil claim in federal court at $15,000 and cost of defending a claim to $20,000 
with both rising to well over $100,000 depending on subject matter.26 
 Broadly speaking, third party litigation funding works in three possible 
ways: (i) through claim acquisition, (ii) through investment in the litigation, 
and (iii) as “after the event” insurance.27 In a claim acquisition, the third party 
purchases the actionable claim directly from the plaintiff either in whole or in 
part.28 In a wide variety of subject areas, a complete acquisition confers 
standing to sue on the acquirer, allowing it to dictate the litigation and 
settlement strategy unilaterally.29 In a litigation investment, the third party 
funds (i.e., invests in) a litigation by fronting capital to the plaintiff for 
litigation and related expenses, in return for a percentage of any eventual 
recovery through judgment or settlement.30 Here, the plaintiff remains in the 
picture and litigates in its own name, but the parties usually enter into complex 
                                                            
21 N.Y.C. Bar, supra note __. 
22 Steinitz, supra note __, at 1277. See also Holly E. Loiseau, Eric C. Lyttle, and Brianna N. Benfield, 
Third-Party Financing of Commercial Litigation, ABA IN-HOUSE LITIGATOR, Vol. 24, No. 4, 2009, at 1; 
id.. 
23 Campbells Cash and Carry Pty. Ltd. v Fostif Pty. Ltd, (2006) 229 CLR 386 (Austl.). 
24 See ASSOC’N OF LITIGATION FUNDERS OF ENGLAND AND WALES, CODE OF CONDUCT FOR LITIGATION 
FUNDERS (2011), available at http://www.calunius.com/media/2540/alf%20code%20of%20practice.pdf.  
25 See generally Emery G. Lee & Thomas E. Willging, Defining the Problem of Cost in Federal Civil 
Litigation, 60 DUKE L.J. 765 (2010). 
26 Id. at 770 (quoting a study conducted by the authors for the Federal Judicial Center).  
27 For a fuller elaboration of these alternatives as they apply to copyright law, see infra Part III.  
28 RAND Institute for Civil Justice, supra note __, at 11. 
29 See Sprint Communications Co., L.P. v. APCC Services, Inc., 128 S.Ct. 2531 (2008) (holding that 
assignees of legal claims have standing under federal law to commence actions).  
30 N.Y.C. Bar, supra note __ (“If the claim appears meritorious, the financing company will advance 
amounts to cover attorneys fees and the other costs of the litigation…[and these] advances typically are 
made to the claimant or its outside litigation counsel, in return for a percentage of any eventual 
recovery.”). 
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arrangements to determine who controls the litigation.31 The third form of 
funding operates on the defendant’s side, and involves a third party purchasing 
a defendant’s litigation risk after a claim has been commenced. In effect this 
operates as a form of insurance, after an event has occurred, but where the 
magnitude of risk remains uncertain—hence its description as a form of “after 
the event insurance”.32 This form of funding is less common in the U.S. than 
the other two, especially since U.S. law doesn't allow fee-shifting by prevailing 
defendants, along the lines of U.K. law.33 Each of these forms of third party 
funding carries over rather well to the unique circumstances of copyright 
litigation, which is discussed in greater detail later.  
All three forms of funding facilitate the creation of “claim markets,” as 
the term is used here. While technically, it is only in a claim acquisition that 
the third party takes a formal ownership stake in the claim, the litigation 
investment and insurance too involve transferring the risk of litigation—either 
in part or in full—to the third party. While the third party many not obtain a 
formal ownership stake, it nonetheless alienates the risk that litigating the 
claim entails through a market mechanism. 
 Despite all of these trends, copyright litigation has remained by and 
large immune to third party involvement. Copyright litigation costs well over 
three times the already-high average cost of litigation.34 And yet, market-based 
solutions to the problem of copyright’s litigation costs have been somewhat 
rare. Unlike in the patent context, where non-performing entities (NPEs) are 
known acquire patents pre-emptively and then sue for infringement,35 
copyright trades rarely ever occur in active anticipation of future litigation.36 
Contingency-fee based arrangements in copyright litigation too are very rare.37 
So too are collective enforcement mechanisms, where individual rights-holders 
                                                            
31 Maya Steinitz, The Litigation Finance Contract, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) 
(manuscript at 38-40). 
32 Jonathan T. Molot, A Market in Litigation Risk, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 367, 380 (2009). 
33 See Philip S. Figa, The “American Rule” Has Outlived its Usefulness: Adopt the “English Rule”, 
NAT’L L.J., Oct. 20, 1986, at 13.  
34 See AIPLA, supra note 11. 
35 See generally Michael Risch, Patent Troll Myths, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 457 (2012). 
36 It is sometimes mistakenly believed that patent infringement claims can be transferred and assigned 
independent of the patent itself. See RAND Institute for Civil Justice, supra note __, at 12 (“Patent claims 
are transferable under federal law.”). This is incorrect. Patent infringement claims, such as those for past 
infringement can be transferred only when accompanied by a transfer/assignment of the patent itself. See 
Crown Die & Tool Co. v. Nye Tool & Mach. Works, 261 U.S. 24, 43 (1923); 8 DONALD S. CHISUM, 
CHISUM ON PATENTS §21.03[g][i] (2011) (“The damage claim cannot be transferred as such apart from 
the patent.”); Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, The Elusive Logic of Standing Doctrine in Intellectual 
Property Law, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1323, 1344 (2000) (noting how such a transfer “must be accompanied by 
an assignment of the underlying patent”). The rules of patent law are in this respect, strikingly similar, to 
those of copyright law. See infra Part IV.A. 
37 Copyright Office, Remedies for Small Copyright Claims: Notice of Inquiry, 76 FED. REG. 66,758, 
66759 (2011). 
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band together to collectively monitor and enforce their rights, thereby cross-
subsidizing their litigation costs.38 
 
II. THE BENEFITS OF A MARKET FOR COPYRIGHT CLAIMS 
 
 Having seen how litigation funding operates, and its failure—thus far—
to influence copyright litigation, this Part moves to examining what the 
copyright system stands to gain through such funding, which effectively would 
result in the creation of a market for copyright claims. It bears re-emphasizing 
that the reference to a “market for claims” here includes not just situations 
where the claim is acquired in its entirety, but also those where third parties 
assume a portion of the risk associated with enforcing the claim by investing 
in, or funding it directly.  
The discussion first looks at certain structural realities of the copyright 
entitlement and litigation, to highlight the need for such third party litigation 
funding (II.A.), and then proceeds to show how the entry of third party funders 
can provide copyright litigation with a host of direct and indirect benefits on 
both the plaintiff and defendant sides (II.B.). 
 
A. Why the Copyright System is Ripe for Litigation Funding 
 
While copyright litigation is no doubt very similar to traditional 
commercial litigation as a structural matter, it nonetheless embodies certain 
characteristics that make it well-suited to the practice of litigation funding. 
Two in particular deserve elaboration here: (i) the copyright entitlement’s 
fundamental dependence on litigation; and (ii) the exorbitant costs of copyright 
litigation (in comparison to other areas) and their distortionary effects on 
copyright law and policy. In some ways the two features are clearly at odds 
with each other, and copyright reform efforts have thus far done little to try and 
align them. 
Copyright law’s basic entitlement structure anticipates and operates in 
the shadow of private litigation. As an analytical matter, copyright grants its 
holder a set of exclusive rights in relation to the protected subject matter, i.e., 
the original expression.39 These rights revolve around the act of copying, 
which is central to copyright law. All the same, since copyright’s subject 
matter is intangible and therefore exhibits the characteristics of resource non-
rivalry and non-excludability, the significance of the exclusive rights 
machinery operates in large part through the correlative duty that it imposes on 
                                                            
38 See C. Scott Hemphill & Jeannie Suk, The Law, Culture, and Economics of Fashion, 61 STAN. L. REV. 
1147, 1193 (2011) (advocating such a mechanism for the fashion industry). 
39 17 U.S.C. §106 (2010). 
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others.40 Copyright thus revolves around the “duty not to copy original 
expression” that it imposes on all but the original owner in society.41 
In other words, ownership over a tangible object endows its owner with 
a set of exclusive rights to use the object. Yet, since the object is both rival and 
excludable in nature, these rights enable the owner to use the object in 
different ways without interference from others in society (i.e., non-owners). 
Moving to copyright though, since the object is intangible expression, the 
owner (the copyright holder) needs no actual enablement to use the object.42 
As a physical matter, the object is perfectly capable of multiple, simultaneous 
use (and copying) by individuals with little problem. Copyright injects an 
artificial scarcity into this environment through its grant of exclusive rights. 
But given the non-rival nature of the object being protected, these exclusive 
rights disable non-owners (i.e., potential copiers) from interfering with the 
copyright holder’s exclusive rights in the work.43 Copyright’s entitlement 
framework is therefore rooted in the disabling duties that it imposes on non-
owners in society. And since copyright is in the end a private law system, for 
this disablement it relies heavily on the owner’s power, ability, and threat to 
invoke the state’s coercive machinery to ensure its realization. The copyright 
entitlement then, to put it simply, revolves analytically around the possibility 
of litigation. 
As a functional matter, the copyright entitlement is formally 
determined for the first time only ever during litigation. Since it is premised on 
automatic protection once a work is created and fixed in a tangible medium of 
expression, litigation performs an important validation function for the 
existence and scope of the entitlement. Unlike the patent entitlement, which 
involves a formal prosecution process that results in the patentee obtaining a 
prima facie entitlement accompanied by a strong presumption of validity, 
copyright law contains no analogous review process.44 Litigation thus performs 
more than just a remedial function in copyright law—i.e., merely correcting a 
harm—but instead also an important constitutive function for the entitlement. 
                                                            
40 See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Obligatory Structure of Copyright Law: Unbundling the Wrong of 
Copying, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1664, 1669 (2012). 
41 Id. at 1667-74. See also Jeremy Waldron, From Authors to Copiers: Individual Rights and Social 
Values in Intellectual Property, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 841, 844 (1993). 
42 See T. Cyprian Williams, Property, Things in Action, and Copyright, 11 L. QUART. REV. 223, 232 
(1895) (making a similar point about the centrality of forbearance to copyright law). 
43 Balganesh, Obligatory Structure, supra note __, at 1670; id. at 226. 
44 For a recent account of this difference see: David Fagundes & Jonathan S. Masur, Costly Intellectual 
Property, 65 VAND. L. REV. 677, 679 (2012) (“Patents vest only after an applicant successfully navigates 
a cumbersome examination process administered by the federal Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) 
[while C]opyrights, by contrast, arise costlessly and often unintentionally, as soon as an author fixes a 
work of authorship in a tangible medium of expression.”). This isn’t to suggest that the patent entitlement 
isn’t subject to the vagaries of the litigation process as well, rendering it probabilistic. See Mark A. 
Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, 19 J. ECON. PERPS. 75 (2005).  
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There remains additionally, an important respect in which copyright is 
also different from the entitlement underlying other private causes of action 
such as those involved in tort claims. While such private claims too are 
determined only during litigation (i.e., by a court), the abstract entitlements 
underlying them are almost never treated as alienable prior to their maturation 
into specific actions. Thus, it is uncommon to speak of trading (or transferring 
away) one’s ‘right not to be negligently injured,’ prior to a negligent act 
actually transpiring.45 Copyright on the other hand is treated as a tradable 
entitlement, in its unmatured form, making it analytically very different. 
Indeed, the copyright entitlement’s tradability in its unmatured form 
and its fundamental dependency on litigation caused some early scholars of the 
common law to argue that copyright was nothing more than a “chose in 
action”, i.e., an actionable claim.46 Since expression could never be 
“possessed” as an object, copyright was thought to be a “claim” that could 
“only be enforced by going to law”.47 Since all forms of property in the 
common law were either choses in action or possession, and copyright was 
clearly intended to be a tradable asset, this view insisted that it had to be 
understood as a chose in action. Copyright law as a structural matter thus 
fundamentally anticipates and depends on the possibility of litigation. Unlike 
other substantive areas where litigation can be seen as performing as 
vindicatory, remedial, or punitive function, litigation is of constitutive 
analytical significance to copyright law. 
This analytical reality however faces an obvious functional problem. In 
spite of the centrality of litigation to copyright’s entitlement structure, 
copyright litigation remains unaffordable to a large number of litigants. The 
average cost of litigating a copyright case through trial ranges from $384,000 
to over $2 million, for both plaintiffs and defendants.48 These costs have risen 
dramatically over the last decade, which has in turn seen a corresponding 
reduction in the number of copyright claims that are actually litigated in court. 
In the year 2005, a total of 5,796 new copyright cases were filed.49 This figure 
has seen a steady decline since, and by 2011 this figure shrunk to 2,297—an 
astounding 60% drop.50 The Copyright Office attributes most of this to the rise 
                                                            
45 See Robert Cooter, Towards a Market for Unmatured Tort Claims, 75 VA. L. REV. 383, 383 (1989) 
(defining the entitlement prior to injury as an “unmatured tort claim”). See also Alan Schwartz, 
Commentary on "Towards a Market in Unmatured Tort Claims": A Long Way Yet to Go, 75 VA. L. REV. 
423 (1989) (describing the problems inherent in allowing such claims to be traded). 
46 See Williams, supra note __, at 223. 
47 Id. at 226. 
48 AMER. INTELLECTUAL PROP. L. ASSOC’N, supra note 11, at 35. 
49 ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2006 JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS: ANNUAL 
REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR JAMES C. DUFF 167 (2006) (detailing filing statistics from 2002 through 2006). 
50 ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS: 2011 ANNUAL 
REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 130 (2011) (detailing filing statistics from 2007 through 2011). 
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in litigation costs, and in 2011 began exploring the possibility of low-cost 
“small claims” courts to decide copyright infringement cases.51 It thus 
observed: 
 
If a copyright owner hires a lawyer, the expenses can add up quickly. 
Contingency fee arrangements are relatively rare in copyright lawsuits; thus 
most copyright owners will have to pay an hourly fee for representation. 
Lawyers charge hundreds of dollars per hour, which could reach a total of 
tens or hundreds of thousands of dollars when a case does not immediately 
settle and instead requires discovery, motion practice, and trial.52 
 
What makes copyright litigation rather expensive though is the 
necessarily fact-intensive nature of the dispute. In bringing a claim, a plaintiff 
must show actual copying by the defendant, which entails proof of access and 
similarity between the works. If the works aren’t identical, the plaintiff also 
needs to establish that the works are “substantially similar”, which is a 
subjective question of fact.53 Courts treat both these issues as questions of fact, 
and are justifiably reluctant to decide them on motions for summary 
judgment.54 The same is largely true for the defendant as well. While fair use is 
itself a question of law, the burden of establishing the facts that determine fair 
use, most notably the “effect” of the defendant’s use on the market for the 
plaintiff’s work,55 falls to the defendant.56 Discovery thus forms a large part of 
the litigation expenses.57 
Litigation costs influence parties’ behavior.58 In addition to influencing 
parties’ litigiousness, i.e., their willingness to bring a claim in court, litigation 
costs also affect parties’ primary behavior, when the substantive regime in 
question is premised on inducing behavior of a specific kind. Tort law is a 
prime example, where the costs of litigation play a major role in a regime’s 
ability to deter negligent behavior. One scholar thus notes that “costly 
litigation implies that the tort system fails to compel actors to exercise socially 
                                                            
51 Copyright Office, Remedies for Small Copyright Claims: Notice of Inquiry, 76 FED. REG. 66,758 
(2011).  
52 Id. at 66,759-60. 
53 Cf. Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Normativity of Copying in Copyright Law, 62 DUKE L.J. 203 (2012) 
(extolling the subjectivity of substantial similarity for pluralist reasons). 
54 See, e.g., Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 
1977) . 
55 17 U.S.C. §107(4) (2010). 
56 See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music Inc., 501 U.S. 569 (1994); 3 NIMMER, supra note __, at 
§12.10[3] (2012). 
57 See Sharon Cullars, Trends in IP Litigation Costs, LEGAL FIN. J., Nov. 24, 2011, 
http://legalfinancejournal.com/trends-in-ip-litigation-costs/ (“One of the major factors contributing to the 
high litigation costs is collecting discovery.”);  
58 RAND INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, supra note __, at 4. 
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optimal precaution” and thus fails in its deterrent function.59 When individuals 
know that the costs of litigation make it unlikely that suits will be brought, the 
law’s ability to deter behavior begins to diminish in large measure. If litigation 
costs can influence a regime’s ability to deter behavior, they must in equal 
measure be able to influence a regime’s ability to incentivize behavior as well. 
And if copyright’s primary purpose lies in providing creators with an incentive 
to create—as courts and policy-makers routinely reiterate60—then, rising 
litigation costs will in a similar vein impede the system’s realization of its core 
objective. The decline in litigation rates might thus suggest not just that parties 
are unwilling to litigate their claims, but rather a decline in the very utilization 
of the copyright system, especially given the centrality of litigation to its 
functioning as noted previously.  
It is of course hard to assess the exact causes for the drop in copyright 
litigation rates, without disaggregating the empirical evidence further. Yet, the 
anecdotal evidence underlying accompanying the Copyright Office’s recent 
study seems to suggest that copyright’s litigation costs are doing more than just 
deterring lawsuits. In its submission, the American Society of Media 
Photographers (ASMP) for instance, described how these costs, and the lack of 
a cost-effective mechanism of redressal were “mak[ing] the investment 
necessary to become and remain a professional photographer a staggering and 
constant burden,61” in effect then deterring the very creative enterprise, rather 
than just the commencement of lawsuits.  
Copyright’s high litigation costs also discourage defendants from 
contesting palpably frivolous, and overbroad infringement claims by copyright 
owners. When offered a settlement that is much lower than what they would 
have had to spend defending the claim—even if they know for sure that they 
are likely to succeed on the merits—rational defendants have good reason to 
prefer settling to litigating.62 This only encourages copyright owners to make 
overbroad claims. Some courts then unthinkingly treat these settlements as 
evidence of vibrant “licensing markets” to constrain the scope of the fair use 
                                                            
59 Keith N. Hylton, Litigation Costs and the Economic Theory of Tort Law, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 111, 113 
(1991). 
60 Sony Corp. of Amer. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 477 (1984) (“Copyright is based on 
the belief that by granting authors the exclusive rights to reproduce their works, they are given an 
incentive to create.”); WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 38-39 (2003); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic 
Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 327 (1989); Justin Hughes, Fair Use Across Time, 50 
UCLA L. REV. 775, 797 (2003); Joseph P. Liu, Copyright and Time: A Proposal, 101 MICH. L. REV. 409, 
428 (2002). 
61 See Victor S. Perlman, General Counsel and Managing Director, American Society of Media 
Photographers, Second Submission of Comments, Oct. 16, 2012, available at 
http://www.copyright.gov/docs/smallclaims/comments/noi_10112012/asmp.comments.2.10.16.12.pdf.  
62 See Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, The Relational Contingency of Rights, 98 VA. L. REV. __ 
(forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 3). 
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defense doctrinally.63 In effect then, defendants’ failure to litigate fair use 
effectively whittles away its scope and significance. The fair use doctrine is 
however more than just a “defense” in copyright law. As copyright’s primary 
safety valve, it safeguards a host of important First Amendment and free 
speech interests, and functions as an incentive for downstream creativity as 
well.64 The functional evisceration of fair use thus has real downsides for 
social welfare and threatens to undermine the very legitimacy of the copyright 
system. 
In short then, copyright’s exorbitant litigation costs affect both 
plaintiffs and defendants, distort the system’s core objectives and safety 
valves, and seem to show no sign of declining. Yet, few solutions seem to 
focus directly on the problem. They instead focus on reforming copyright 
doctrine, the law-making process or the adjudicative process. “Litigation” and 
the litigation-process as such are blamed for these costs and treated as a part of 
the problem rather than the solution. Litigation funding allows copyright law to 
directly address the problem of spiraling litigation costs without undermining 
its very dependence on litigation. 
 
B. Third Party Funding in Copyright Law 
 
Having seen why copyright litigation remains structurally well-suited 
to third party funding, this Section moves to identifying the concrete 
advantages that copyright law, practice, and policy are likely to see by 
allowing third parties to acquire and invest in infringement claims. 
 
1. Reducing Incentive Dissipation 
 
Copyright’s raison d’être is thought to lie in its ability to induce the 
production of creative expression.65 Despite the lack of empirical confirmation 
for this theory, it continues to inform copyright law-making, judicial 
interpretation of copyright doctrine, and scholarly writing on the subject.66 By 
promising creators a set of temporally limited exclusive rights in any original 
work of expression that they produce, copyright law is thought to incentivize 
                                                            
63 See James Gibson, Accidental Rights, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 348 (2007); Gibson, Risk Aversion, 
supra note __, at 907. 
64 See Harry N. Rosenfield, The Constitutional Dimension of “Fair Use” in Copyright Law, 50 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 790 (1974). See also COMP. & COMM. INDUS. ASS’N, FAIR USE IN THE U.S. ECONOMY: 
ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTION OF INDUSTRIES RELYING ON FAIR USE (2010) (detailing the extensive economic 
contributions made by “industries whose output is driven increasingly by activities made possible by fair 
use”). 
65 See, e.g., Justin Hughes, Fair Use Across Time, 50 UCLA L. REV. 775, 797 (2003); Stewart E. Sterk, 
Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1197, 1198–1204 (1996). 
66 Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Copyrights as Incentives: Did We Just Imagine That?, 12 THEORETICAL 
INQ. IN THE L. 29, 32-34 (2011). 
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the creation of such expression.67 In other words, by promising creators 
recourse to the state’s mechanism for disabling others from making 
unauthorized copies of an original work of authorship, copyright law is thought 
to motivate the production of such work. Now if recourse to the state’s 
enforcement mechanism to prevent unauthorized copying is unaffordable (as 
noted earlier), and rational creators know this upfront, this fact will certainly 
interfere with copyright’s ability to act as an inducement. 
Assume that that cost of making a work—to Anne, an author—is 
$2,000 and that she also knows that by selling copies of the work in the 
market, she can earn $5,000, making a net profit of $3,000. Copyright law is 
thought to signal to the creator that by disabling others from copying the work 
(once created), it will allow her to exploit the full market potential, i.e., $5,000, 
for copies of the work; and in the process induce her to produce the work. Now 
assume that a competitor appropriates (i.e., copies) Anne’s work, as a result of 
which the market for the original shrinks to sales of $1,000, below her initial 
investment, i.e., her costs of creation. At this point, for Anne to be incentivized 
to seek these lost profits in an infringement action, she will need to be assured 
of a net gain at the end, taking into account the costs of both creation and 
litigation.68 In our scenario, this means that for Anne to recover $4,000 (the 
lost profits), the cost of litigation must be well below $3,000, to make it 
economically viable. If this is unlikely, and she knows this is in advance (i.e., 
prior to creation), her rational economic incentive to create the work will 
altogether disappear, since she will recognize simultaneously that (i) 
substitutive copying is likely to impact her profits, (ii) the costs of 
commencing an action against the copier to recoup these profits are very high, 
and (iii) as a result, they each individually and in conjunction make the 
creative activity altogether unprofitable.  
The costs of copyright litigation thus influence not just the decision 
whether to litigate, but in scenarios where copying is both easy and very likely, 
they are also likely to affect the decision whether to create the work to begin 
with. The same holds true in varying degrees even when the unauthorized 
copying doesn't cause the creator’s profits to fall below the break-even point. 
Table 1 is illustrative, which shows that even when creators expect large 
returns on their creative work and the extent of infringement increases, the 
                                                            
67 Id. at 31 (noting how the incentive theory “conceives of the creative individual as a rational profit-
maximizer whose willingness to invest effort, time, and resources in creative enterprises is directly 
correlated to the expected extent of the returns that will be forthcoming”); William M. Landes & Richard 
A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 471, 474 (2003). 
68 If she spends $2,000 in creating the work, and $3,000 in litigating for lost profits owing to copyright 
infringement, she ends up recovering $4,000 in lost profit compensation, and $1,000 in terms of 
independent sales, barely allowing her to break even. Even at this point, a rational creator who can 
predict these costs upfront—which is hardly unlikely today—is unlikely to want to create in the first 
place. 
COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT MARKETS                                  15 
 
costs of litigating the infringement claim begin to rise exponentially too, in 
effect lowering the incentive to create quite dramatically. The economic 
decision to create is thus impacted by high litigation costs, a factor that is 
especially true for individual and one-off creators. The inefficiency of 
litigation effectively dilutes and dissipates the economic incentive that the 
copyright system purports to grant authors. 
 
Table 1: Incentive Reduction Owing to Litigation Costs 
 
 It might be thought that copyright’s allowance for plaintiffs to elect for 
statutory damages and recover reasonable attorney’s fees alleviates this 
problem.69 In reality though, these mechanisms still require copyright owners 
to make significant out of pocket payments to sustain the litigation, in the hope 
of obtaining these remedies, which in addition, are “not guaranteed”.70 It is 
precisely because of copyright’s rising litigation costs and their effect on 
creators that the Copyright Office has recently begun considering the 
possibility of alternative “small claims” dispute resolution mechanisms where 
the litigation costs are likely to be significantly lower.71 
Litigation funding, while not directly lowering the costs of copyright 
litigation in the abstract, nonetheless can ensure that effect of these costs is felt 
most directly on someone other than the creator. In the process, it reduces the 
extent to which these costs influence the incentive to create, the institution’s 
primary purpose. When a creator’s work is purportedly infringed by a copier, 
litigation funding would now allow third parties to either acquire the 
infringement claim from the creator and pursue the claim directly, or instead 
enable them to fund the claim by fronting capital to the creator, who will still 
bring the action in his/her own name.72 In such an arrangement, the creator is 
                                                            
69 See 17 U.S.C. §504 & §505 (2010). 
70 See Copyright Office, supra note 54, at 66,760. 
71 Id. at 66,758. 
72 Part IV details further how copyright law’s rules on exclusive licensing make this a distinctively 
feasible possibility. 
Cost of 
Creation 
Expected 
Sales 
Expected 
Benefit 
(Pre-
litigation) 
Lost 
Profits 
(Owing 
to 
copying) 
Expected 
Litigation 
Costs 
Expected 
Benefit 
(Post-
Litigation) 
Reduction 
in 
Incentive 
2,000 4,000 2,000 2,000 5,000 –3,000 250% 
2,000 6,000 4,000 3,000 5,000 –1,000 125% 
2,000 10,000 8,000 5,000 5,000 3,000 62.5% 
2,000 20,000 18,000 10,000 7,000 11,000 50% 
2,000 30,000 28,000 15,000 10,000 18,000 35.7% 
2,000 100,000 98,000 50,000 20,000 78,000 20.4% 
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able to obtain upfront payment for its claim (either directly or indirectly), 
which while likely to be less than the total expected value of the claim, is 
nonetheless sure to be higher than what the creator might have gotten on her 
own. This is so for two possible reasons. One, the litigation funder is likely to 
have lower litigation costs, making the lawsuit potentially lucrative, with some 
of those benefits passing on to the creator. Two, the litigation funder—unlike 
the creator—will be able to value the lawsuit based not just on the creator’s 
lost profits, but on the availability of statutory damages, since this now 
becomes a realistic possibility.  
The litigation funder has obvious incentives to enter into such 
arrangements. Remember that a litigation funder is usually an entity with 
expertise in litigation. The ability to accurately value a claim and assess the 
probability of a favorable outcome, the ready access to large stores of capital, 
and the expertise to run the process efficiently are characteristic features of 
such funders. The funder is thus well positioned to take advantage of copyright 
law’s allowance for statutory damages, since the out of pocket expenses 
needed to run the litigation are hardly a deterrent. Going back to our earlier 
hypothetical involving Anne the creator, reveals how this might work.  
To Anne, the costs of litigating the claim for lost profits of $4,000 
might be $3,000, making it economically impractical to pursue. But to a 
litigation funder, XYZ, Inc, these costs might be significantly lower—say 
$1,000. If XYZ now approaches Anne and offers to pay her $2,000 for the 
claim (which is worth $4,000), Anne still makes a net gain of $1,000 in the 
overall scheme of things, effectively preserving her incentive to create. XYZ 
too can expect a gain from the litigation (of $1,000) as well, even if lost profits 
were the sole basis for valuing the claim. In reality though, even if XYZ’s 
costs of litigation are the same as what they were for Anne, XYZ might value 
the claim much higher—say at $20,000—under copyright’s statutory damages 
regime.73 Since XYZ has the liquidity for the large out of pocket expenses, 
which are still likely to be far lower than this recovery, especially if attorney’s 
fees are also awarded, the lawsuit now becomes a potentially lucrative 
investment opportunity. Very importantly though, this might even have an 
effect on Anne’s arrangement with XYZ. If Anne knows that XYZ values the 
litigation not just on the basis of lost profits but instead based on the possible 
recovery of statutory damages, Anne is likely to negotiate for a much higher 
upfront payment for the claim. XYZ might thus choose to pay Anne $6,000 if 
it knows that statutory damages are very likely, based on its assessment of the 
                                                            
73 Copyright’s statutory damages regime contained in 17 U.S.C. §504 allows a plaintiff to elect to receive 
statutory damages in lieu of actual damages, without having to establish a reason for the election. Once 
the election is made, and an infringement is fond, a court is obligated to award the plaintiff no less than 
$750 and no more than $30,000 per work infringed. 17 U.S.C. §504(c)(1) (2010). In the event that the 
infringement is found to be willful, these damages can go to as high as $150,000 per work infringed. 17 
U.S.C. §504(c)(2) (2010). 
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claim. Anne thus stands to earn a net profit of $5,000 from the overall scheme 
now. If creators such as Anne know that litigation funders exist to assist them 
with their infringement claims, their presence not only preserves their original 
incentive to create, but introduces the distinct possibility of enlarging it, by 
making the availability of statutory damages seem realistic. 
In effect then, litigation funding is likely do two things simultaneously 
for copyright’s incentive structure. First, it will likely prevent the complete 
dissipation of the incentive to create, by ensuring that creators don't have to 
feel compelled to litigate the claim themselves in order to recover lost profits. 
They could rely on third parties to enforce the claim, and thereby obtain a 
significant portion of these lost profits.  Second, it will form a bridge between 
the creator and the Copyright Act’s provision for statutory damages. By 
introducing a new set of participants into the system for whom the availability 
of large statutory damages after expensive litigation is both an independent 
incentive and of little hardship, it raises the market value of creators’ 
actionable infringement claims and allows them to internalize a significant 
portion of this surplus. In the process, it allows for the possibility that 
copyright litigation might, counter-intuitively, now actively enhance creators’ 
incentives to produce. 
  
2. Lowering Agency Costs 
 
A second benefit of litigation funding in copyright remains the 
possibility that it will lower agency costs between clients and lawyers in 
monitoring and enforcing infringement. Agency costs originate in a principal-
agent problem, where an agent tasked with protecting a principal’s interest has 
insufficient incentives to do so, which produces a net welfare loss.74 It arises 
owing to the “the impossibility of complete contracting when one party (the 
agent) has discretionary and unobservable decision-making authority that 
affects the wealth of another party (the principal).75” It originates in situations 
where the principal has no way of monitoring the implementation of an 
arrangement with the agent, as a result of which the principal has little basis to 
know whether the agent’s own conduct, or external factors produced a certain, 
less than perfectly desirable outcome.76 
                                                            
74 For a general overview of the principal-agent problem, see: HAL R. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE 
MICROECONOMICS: A MODERN APPROACH 667-88 (6th ed. 2003); Kenneth J. Arrow, The Economics of 
Agency, in PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 37–51 (John W. Pratt & Richard J. 
Zeckhauser eds., 1985). 
75 Robert H. Sitkoff, An Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 621, 636 (2004). 
76 See Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem, 51 
ECONOMETRICA 7, 7 (1983); Stephen A. Ross, The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal’s 
Problem, 63 AM. ECON. REV. 134 (1973). 
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While agency costs are endemic to the attorney-client relationship in all 
substantive areas, they remain exacerbated in copyright law for a variety of 
inter-related reasons. As a direct consequence of its idiosyncratic subject 
matter (i.e., expression) that is protected automatically upon creation and 
fixation, copyright law operates primarily through standards rather than rules. 
As is well known, standards, which tend to be imprecise and open-ended, lack 
the certainty of rules and entail higher costs in their application.77 Actors, who 
seek to be guided by the law, are the principal bearers of these costs, which 
usually manifest themselves either in the time and effort needed to understand 
the law and precedents, in obtaining professional legal advice, and in needing a 
comprehensive process of adjudication for courts to fill the content of these 
standards circumstantially ex post.78 Copyright’s unending standards thus 
exacerbate the information asymmetry between non-specialist creator/copier 
and his or her lawyer, which is the basis of the principal-agent problem.79 And 
perhaps most importantly, this is so for both plaintiffs and defendants. 
Take the plaintiff’s side first. In situations where a defendant’s copying 
isn’t literal or verbatim, a plaintiff is obligated to establish that the defendant’s 
work is “substantially similar” to the plaintiff’s protected work, to establish a 
prima facie case of infringement.80 As is obvious from its very title, substantial 
similarity is hardly a straightforward question, and is by most accounts, 
copyright law’s most complex mechanism.81 Determining whether it is met in 
an individual case is a probabilistic assessment that entails examining a host of 
precedents and expert reports, and predicting a jury’s intuitive response to the 
comparison. On the defendant’s side, “fair use” is at once copyright law’s 
primary defense, but also its most uncertain doctrine.82 Note that all of the 
principal-agent problems that we previously discussed, apply with equal force 
to defendants in copyright cases as well. Determining whether a use is non-
infringing under the fair use doctrine in similar fashion requires resort to expert 
legal advice, in order to predict what a court is likely to do. Once again, the 
information asymmetry between principal and agent comes to be exacerbated. 
Indeed, for copyright defendants, empirical data too seems to suggest that 
avoiding any reliance on expert advice—and thereby minimizing both 
                                                            
77 For an early account of the rules versus standards debate, see Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 
35 U. CHI. L. Rev. 14 (1967). The leading economic analysis of the distinction is by Louis Kaplow. See 
Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992). 
78 Kaplow, supra note __, at 569. 
79 See David Fagundes, Crystals in the Public Domain, 50 B.C. L. REV. 139, 151 (2009). 
80 Id. at 157-60.  
81 For a fuller discussion of substantial similarity in copyright law, see Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The 
Normativity of Copying in Copyright Law, 62 DUKE L.J. 203 (2012) (detailing the complexity of 
substantial similarity and its working, and finding a rationale for such complexity). 
82 Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939) (describing the fair use doctrine as 
copyright’s “most troublesome” doctrine today). 
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litigation and agency costs—seems to be a preferred option, even when it is 
overall welfare-minimizing and inefficient (i.e., when the defendant does 
indeed have a valid claim of fair use).83  
 To see how these costs impact copyright plaintiffs and defendants, 
consider the following hypothetical. Assume that Anne, our creator from the 
previous hypothetical, identifies the infringement that is causing her to lose 
profits, chooses to litigate the claim, and to this end retains the law firm ABC 
LLP for the same. Seeing her unwillingness to pay the firm’s exorbitant “per-
hour” charges, the firm offers to litigate the matter on a contingency fee basis. 
It agrees to take 30% of any settlement or judgment, instead of its hourly rate 
of $200 per hour. Early on in the litigation, the defendant agrees to settle the 
matter instead of proceeding to trial, and offers to settle the claim for $3,900. 
ABC has invested no more than two billable hours of time into the matter in 
all. 
Let’s leave aside for now any question of Anne’s ex ante incentives to 
create and how the litigation costs might impact that.84 In this scenario, ABC 
makes $1,300 from the settlement, and having spent two billable hours (worth 
$400 in all), its net gain in $900. Anne takes $2,600 from the settlement. On 
the face of things, this outcome seems fine for all parties involved: Anne 
breaks even, the firm makes a net gain, and neither plaintiff nor defendant 
wastes large expenses in protracted copyright litigation. Assume however that 
an extra hour’s worth of research (say, into the jurisprudence of substantial 
similarity, to allege that the defendant’s copying might have allowed the court 
to decide the matter on summary judgment) would have forced the defendant 
to raise its settlement offer by another $600 to $4,500. Assuming that ABC 
knows this to be likely, in deciding whether to spend the extra time doing this 
research, ABC has no incentive to do so. For even though it will raise the 
award by $400 for Anne (making her payout $3,000), the extra effort produces 
no net gain for the law firm, ABC. The extra hour is worth $200 to them, 
which is also exactly what they will likely make from the increased settlement. 
The agent’s (i.e., ABC’s) failure to make this extra effort now causes the 
principal (Anne) a loss of $400, which is a welfare loss. Anne has no way of 
knowing this, since her ability to monitor ABC’s actions is very limited. This 
welfare loss is entirely a result of the principal-agent problem. 
Even if Anne had chosen to be billed on an hourly basis, the problem 
would have manifested itself, but in a different form. In the initial settlement 
offer, Anne would have made $3,500, and the firm $400. Here however, ABC 
would have had every reason to continue negotiating with the defendant for 
every minor increment in the settlement. Thus if it takes ABC an additional 
five hours to raise the settlement by an added $750, it might choose to do so to 
                                                            
83 See Gibson, supra note __, at 887; Fagundes, supra note __, at 153. 
84 For a discussion of this see supra Part II.B.1 above. 
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make an additional $1000, and raise Anne’s settlement to $4,650. Again Anne 
would have no way of knowing this, or monitoring ABC’s incremental actions. 
All the same, Anne is paying $1000 for the added $750, producing an 
analogous welfare loss of $250, caused once again by the principal-agent 
problem.  
The welfare loss that these situations produce together with the costs it 
would take for a principal to effectively monitor the agent’s actions to ensure 
compliance, constitute the “agency costs” produced.85 The principal-agent 
problem, and the accompanying agency costs/welfare losses that it produces 
are the result of a misalignment of parties’ interests, which produces 
contradictory incentives. An obvious solution is thus one that aligns parties’ 
interests, or at least minimizes the possibility that they point in opposite 
directions.86 In the copyright context, the extensive information asymmetry 
between lawyer and client exacerbates this. This is where the involvement of 
third parties will help. 
Litigation funding arrangements allow for control—complete or 
substantial—over the copyright litigation process to be vested in the 
entity/individual actually bearing its full costs. In the process, it effectively 
eliminates the moral hazard that legal representation entails. Litigation funders 
are usually entities with significant legal expertise of their own, which would 
allow them to avoid relying entirely on outside representation to value, litigate, 
and settle the copyright claims that they acquire.87 The process of claim 
acquisition thus allows such funders to obtain the claim from plaintiffs and 
litigate it on their own. This in turn situates ownership and control over the 
process in a single entity. Even when the funding is short of an outright 
acquisition—for instance, partial funding, or an investment—it still ordinarily 
relegates a good deal of control over the process to the third party funder, 
specifically in order to allow it to ensure that the funding is used effectively, 
and to avoid the moral hazard previously identified.88 
In short, the principal-agent problem is pervasive in copyright litigation 
and produces a host of social welfare losses, which a market for infringement 
claims would serve to minimize quite significantly. 
 
3. Lowering the Costs of Defendant Risk-Aversion 
 
                                                            
85 See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency 
Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976). 
86 Sitkoff, supra note __, at 637-38 (summarizing some of these solutions in other areas). 
87 See Lyon, supra note __, at 593, 602, 608 (detailing the expertise of litigation funders). 
88 See, e.g., Steinitz, Litigation Finance Contract, supra note __, at 54 (analyzing a control mechanism in 
place for a complex litigation financing arrangement involving an investment rather than an outright 
acquisition).  
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Defendant risk aversion remains a major problem in copyright law. In 
addition to generating a host of socially inefficient practices, it also routinely 
distorts interpretations of the fair use doctrine.89 Solutions to the problem have 
almost always focused on changes to copyright doctrine or institutions in order 
to introduce more bright-line rules into the system, in the belief that this would 
introduce greater certainty for litigants threatened with lawsuits.90 The fair use 
doctrine, the device around which much of this risk aversion is seen, is thus 
thought to be in need of serious reform. And yet, there seems little reason to 
believe that courts or Congress will do anything at all to amend the current 
version of the doctrine.91 Here again, litigation funding can ameliorate the 
situation—at least partially. 
Litigation funding is ordinarily thought to operate exclusively on the 
plaintiff’s side. This need not be the case. In several common law jurisdictions, 
a market has begun to emerge for what is known as “after the event” (or ATE) 
insurance.92 In these situations, a third party insurer enters the picture and 
offers to insure a party—i.e., the defendant—after litigation has been 
commenced.93 The premium for these policies is usually based on the unique 
nature of the claim and the possibility of a successful defense. The insurer in 
these policies, very importantly, doesn't offer to insure against the actual 
outcome or verdict, but rather against the expenses that the defendant needs to 
incur to defend the claim in court.94 This includes attorney’s fees, litigation 
costs, the costs of discovery, and the like. Indeed, in jurisdictions where the 
market for such policies is fairly robust on both the plaintiff and defendant 
sides, courts today allow claims for fee-shifting (i.e., to recover any attorney’s 
fees) to include the premiums that a party has paid for any after the event 
insurance.95  
We could envision an expansion of this model where the defendant 
insures not just the expenses of litigation, but also the underlying 
                                                            
89 Gibson, supra note __, at 881-906. 
90 See, e.g., Michael W. Carroll, Fixing Fair Use, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1087, 1143 (2007) (offering a 
regulatory solution to the uncertainty of fair use and analyzing other similar solutions); Gideon 
Parchomovsky & Kevin A. Goldman, Fair Use Harbors, 93 VA. L. REV. 1483 (2007) (advocating the use 
of bright-line harbors in fair use law to add certainty). 
91 Litman, supra note __, at 41 (articulating a series of reforms but noting how they are very unlikely to 
be enacted into law). 
92 For a recent overview of this phenomenon, see Fee Shifting and After the Event Insurance: A Twist to a 
Thirteenth Century Approach to Shifting Attorneys’ Fees to Solve a Twenty-First Century Problem, 59 
DRAKE L. REV. 1199, 1202-04 (2011).  
93 Id. at 1203. 
94 See, e.g., After the Event Insurance, THE JUDGE, http://www.thejudge.co.uk/index.php/after-the-event-
insurance#tab1 (last visited June 18, 2012) (“ATE Insurance (sometimes known as ‘Litigation 
Insurance’) provides an indemnity for legal costs in the event that the litigation or arbitration is 
lost…[and] typically covers the potential liability for the other side’s costs (adverse costs), as well as 
some or all of the client’s own legal fees.”) 
95 See, e.g., U.K. CIV. P. R. 44.3A & 44.3B (2012). 
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award/settlement as well. In this scenario, the defendant would purchase 
insurance from a third party that covers the expenses of litigation and a likely 
settlement/award figure, which is based not on what the plaintiff seeks in its 
claim or settlement offer, but rather on what the third party insurer objectively 
values the suit at, based on its own independent assessment of its ability to 
defend the claim, or force the plaintiff to a lower settlement. In recent work, 
Jonathan Molot has made the tentative case for such a modification of the 
insurance model, into what he calls the “market for litigation risk”.96 He notes 
however that for this model to work, among other things, insurers would need 
to develop a way of valuing the litigation risk being acquired, which is highly 
problematic given how individualized it is likely to be.97 The heterogeneity of 
the risk is thought to impede insurers’ ability to pool it together.98 Molot 
however assumes the third party insurer’s portfolio of litigation risks to be 
sufficiently diversified—either in actuality or as a goal. In other words, the 
problems of individualized risk are enhanced by the diverse areas that the 
insurer is looking at. If the insurer were to instead focus on one specialized 
area, and rely on the valuations and assessments of its lawyers (rather than 
actuaries) as Molot suggests,99 a large part of this problem is likely to 
disappear. Indeed, this is how a fair use insurance market might begin to 
emerge in copyright litigation. 
While uncertain to the lay individual, the fair use doctrine is hardly 
completely unpredictable. With the vast amount of fair use jurisprudence that 
has developed over the years, coupled with the fact that it is a question for the 
court and not the jury, lawyers are today in a position to make a decent enough 
probabilistic assessment of whether a fair use defense remains viable or not in 
any particular case. In an extensive new empirical study, Matthew Sag reviews 
all fair use decisions handed down by federal courts to see if the doctrine is 
indeed predictably applied, and whether some coherence can be seen in cases 
decided using the doctrine.100 Sag concludes that contrary to common 
perception, fair use decisions are indeed predictable along multiple 
dimensions. He goes on to note that in practice, the doctrine is hardly as 
incoherent as is believed to be.101 Over time and context, we today have a vast 
amount of fair use jurisprudence that actuaries—working with lawyers, as 
Molot suggests—should be able to synthesize into probabilistic assessments of 
the defense succeeding in any particular case.  
                                                            
96 Molot, Market for Litigation Risk, supra note __, at 375. 
97 Id. at 380-85. 
98 Id. at 381. 
99 Id. at 384. 
100 Matthew Sag, Predicting Fair Use, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (2012). 
101 Id. at 85 (noting how the study “offers considerable evidence against the oft-repeated assertion that 
fair use adjudication is blighted by unpredictability and doctrinal incoherence”). 
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Third party litigation funders might thus, with the right set of 
procedural changes, begin to offer a tailored insurance product to defendants in 
copyright infringement claims—known as fair use insurance. The insurer 
would thus assess the likelihood of a defendant successfully raising the fair use 
defense in a copyright claim and offer to acquire the litigation risk from the 
defendant in return for a premium. If the premium is tied directly to the likely 
payout that the insurer will have to make, it may well be lower than a 
settlement offer made by the plaintiff, especially when the fair use defense is 
very strong. Copyright law already contains a provision allowing for attorney 
fee shifting, which applies to defendants just as much as it does to plaintiffs.102 
If courts began interpreting it purposively, and followed the approach of U.K. 
courts in allowing litigation insurance premiums to be recovered as well,103 we 
might well expect to see defendants transferring their litigation risk to an 
insurer, who then takes over the defense from the litigant (as a subrogation) 
instead of defendants caving in and settling for the amount demanded by the 
plaintiff. The insurer might hope that its entry and expertise will force the 
plaintiff to offer a low settlement, or indeed withdraw the claim altogether 
where it is without merit. Consider the following hypothetical. 
ABC Studios commences an action against Joe for using a 10 second 
clip of its new blockbuster movie in a documentary film that Joe makes for his 
college project. ABC sends him a cease and desist letter (which he ignores), 
and then threaten him with damages of $150,000 for willful infringement. 
ABC also offers to settle the matter if he admits liability and pays $12,000 for 
a license. Joe knows that his use is very likely (if not certainly) a fair use of the 
work, but recognizes that even if he were to litigate the claim, it would cost 
him $20,000 (in attorney’s fees) to do so. Even though current law allows 
courts to award successful defendants their “reasonable” attorney’s fees,104 to 
Joe the risk of this award not covering his fees and the need for immediate 
liquidity cover the out-of-pocket expenses that this entails, makes him more 
willing to accede to ABC’s demands and settle. This in many ways represents 
precisely what happens today. If litigation funding were to develop here, we 
might expect an entity, let’s call it LF Inc., a litigation funder, to provide 
copyright defendants with an insurance product once the claim is filed. LF, 
Inc., would be an entity with significant expertise in copyright matters, with 
the capital to take on the risks that Joe is averse to. To make it viable for Joe, 
LF would have to offer Joe a premium lower than the projected settlement 
                                                            
102 See 17 U.S.C. §505 (2010) (allowing courts to award reasonable attorney’s fees to the prevailing 
party); Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 527 (1994) (concluding that §505 applies to defendants 
and observing that “defendants who seek to advance a variety of meritorious copyright defenses should 
be encouraged to litigate them to the same extent that plaintiffs are encouraged to litigate meritorious 
claims of infringement”). 
103 U.K. CIV. P. R. 44.3A & 44.3B (2012). 
104 17 U.S.C. §505 (2010). 
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offer from ABC. Say, LF offers Joe insurance for $6,000. LF knows fully 
well—from its assessment of past fair use cases—that ABC’s claim is (a) 
without merit, (b) as a result likely to also result in an award of attorney’s fees, 
and (c) that it has the ability and expertise to deal with the matter at a cost 
much lower than it would take for Joe to do so. In acquiring the defense claim 
from Joe, LF also hopes that ABC will come to recognize that the bargaining 
asymmetry which previously existed has now been eliminated, making it more 
willing to withdraw its claim altogether, or at worst to settle for a significantly 
lower amount (~$1,000)—rendering its own investment profitable. 
As an insurer with the ability to spread its risk across a wide range of 
parties, LF is likely to be far less risk averse than Joe, an individual litigant. LF 
also has the resources and expertise at its disposal, to lower its risk. This in 
turn allows it to fund defendants with otherwise high-risk claims. While such 
funding certainly doesn't eliminate defendant risk-aversion in its entirety and in 
some ways is parasitic on it, it has the direct effect of reducing the socially 
wasteful costs associated with such risk aversion—both to the defendant, and 
the copyright system as a whole. In the aggregate, the funder’s risk-taking 
neutralizes some of the effects of the defendant’s risk aversion. 
A more direct solution to the problem might seem to lie in reducing 
defendants’ overall litigation costs, thereby curtailing their risk aversion and its 
negative effects at its source. As a practical matter though, this is highly 
unlikely. First, extremely high litigation costs are hardly unique to copyright 
litigation. Most forms of commercial litigation face the same problem, and 
given that copyright disputes are indeed litigated in general (rather than 
specialized) federal courts, copyright litigants must endure the realities of the 
overall system. What makes it problematic for copyright however, is how 
heavily dependent the entitlement and its functioning are on such litigation. 
Thus, any lowering of costs will need to happen system-wide. Second, 
plaintiff-side lawyers—and the legal profession more generally—have little to 
gain from such a reduction. Both these factors render it highly unlikely that 
lowering litigation costs remains at all a viable solution. The entry of defendant 
funders however ensures that the full impact of these costs isn’t felt solely by 
defendants, which in turn distorts copyright doctrine. 
To be sure, the entry of defense funders will certainly not eliminate the 
socially wasteful effects of defendant risk aversion altogether. In the 
hypothetical above, Joe still is forced to buy insurance (and transfer the 
defense to LF) when he shouldn’t have to do so at all as a matter of law, owing 
to the fair use doctrine. All that LF’s entry is able to achieve is a reduction, 
albeit a significant one, in the wasted expense. At the same time though, as 
more and more defense funders begin to enter copyright litigation, and the 
market becomes more robust, we are likely to see a huge reduction in the 
number of frivolous lawsuits being brought, i.e., lawsuits where a defendant 
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has a complete defense, and the plaintiff is merely seeking to take advantage of 
a defendant’s risk aversion. Just as funding on the claim (i.e., plaintiff’s) side 
forms a bridge between the creator and the regime of statutory damages, 
funding on the defense side is likely to form an analogous bridge between a 
defendant with a strong defense and copyright’s fee-shifting provision, if 
sufficiently strengthened. 
 
4. Valuing and Sorting Claims 
 
In addition to performing an allocative function, markets in numerous 
contexts also perform the important purpose of enabling a price-based 
“commensuration” of anything transacted in.105 Commensuration refers to the 
process of comparing “different entities according to a common metric.106” A 
market for copyright claims would thus, in addition to allowing the claim to 
vest in an entity best positioned to enforce it, also result in a process wherein 
those very entities come to value the claim based on its probability of 
succeeding. With their purchase of or investment in the claim becoming public, 
this would have the effect of sending a signal to the parties involved, and 
indeed the court, on the strength of the claim in question. 
This is especially likely to be true in situations where the third party’s 
involvement is an outright acquisition of the claim, i.e., a claim transfer.107 At 
the time of commencement of the action, or during discovery thereafter, a third 
party’s acquisition of the claim and the price of such acquisition are likely to 
become public. This will in turn send an important signal – both to the other 
side, and potentially to courts as well. To the other side, it will signal the 
possibility that the claim is with some merit, evidenced in the third party’s 
willingness to assume some of the risk that it entails. Meritless or frivolous 
claims are unlikely to attract such investment or acquisition. To a court, in 
similar vein, the third party’s involvement might signal the absence of a 
frivolous or meritless claim. Yet, as a functional matter, what is likely to be 
more important to the system than what an actual acquisition or investment 
signals, is likely to be what the absence of such an acquisition of investment 
signals in a robust market.  
In due course, when infringement claims of a certain kind are routinely 
financed by third parties, a litigant’s inability to secure such third party 
involvement might communicate a signal that the claim has a low probability 
                                                            
105 See DANIEL MARKOVITS, MARKET SOLIDARITY 22 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
106 Wendy Nelson Espeland & Mitchell L. Stevens, Commensuration as a Social Process, 24 ANN. REV. 
SOC. 313, 313 (1998). 
107 Every plaintiff in a copyright infringement suit bears the burden of establishing its ownership of a 
valid copyright. See 4 NIMMER, supra note __, at §13.01[A]. In situations where a third party acquires the 
claim from a creator-plaintiff, it too would have to present evidence of this ownership, for which the 
details of its acquisition will have to be entered into the court record.  
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of success, or indeed that it is meritless. This is in turn likely to make a 
defendant more willing to contest the claim, rather than settling early. In 
addition, this considered non-involvement by third parties is also likely to deter 
plaintiffs themselves from bringing such claims. In other words, a third party’s 
refusal to fund or acquire an infringement claim for reasons having to do with 
the strength of the claim might in reality work to deter the very entry of such 
claims into the litigation system.108 
The idea of third parties being involved in the funding and acquisition 
of legal claims has met with a good deal of objection from those who believe 
that it is likely to raise the overall volume of litigation in courts, and encourage 
lawsuits to be brought where previously none might have.109 Some have even 
suggested that it is likely to result in more frivolous lawsuits being brought.110 
Yet it is indeed more likely that just the opposite will occur. When a potential 
plaintiff receives information from a third party to the effect that the claim is 
very weak and unworthy of outside investment, the plaintiff is highly likely to 
abandon it altogether. Litigation, it is often forgotten, involves large emotional, 
dignitary, and reputational costs, besides the obvious first order costs of its 
own.111 Max Schanzenbach and David Dana point this out, in advocating for 
the greater involvement of third parties in tort litigation. They thus note that 
“the flip side to communicating the high value of strong, low-risk claims, is 
that it will also communicate the low value of nuisance claims [and a]ssuming 
a distaste for litigation among most people, a strong ex ante signal of claim 
value may act as a deterrent to low-value claims.112” When the probability of 
success is objectively calibrated—using third parties—even an otherwise risk-
taking or over-optimistic plaintiff is likely to exhibit a reduced willingness to 
bring and continue the claim in court. 
In short then, the entry of third parties into copyright litigation is likely 
to introduce a valuable sorting mechanism into the system. Key beneficiaries 
of this sorting are likely to be potential defendants, courts, and on occasion 
plaintiffs themselves.  
 
III. STRUCTURING A MARKET FOR COPYRIGHT CLAIMS 
  
                                                            
108 See Max Schanzenbach & David Dana, How Would Third Party Financing Change the Face of 
American Tort Litigation? The Role of Agency Costs in the Attorney-Client Relationship, (Searle Ctr. on 
Law, Regulation, & Econ. Growth Pub. Policy Roundtable on Third Party Financing of Litigation, Sep. 
24-25, 2009), available at http://www.law.northwestern.edu/searlecenter/papers/Schanzenbach_Agency 
%20Costs.pdf. 
109 See U.S. CHAMBER INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL REFORM, supra note __, at 5-6. 
110 Id. 
111 Schanzenbach & Dana, supra note __, at 12. 
112 Id. at 13. 
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 Having seen how the involvement of third parties in copyright 
litigation—through a market for actionable copyright claims—might serve to 
benefit both plaintiffs and defendants, and in the process reduce the various 
social costs traditionally associated with protracted litigation, this Part moves 
to describing how such a market might take shape and some of the necessary 
doctrinal changes that will need to be put in place to encourage and regulate 
the development of this market.  
Section III.A describes five possible market arrangements wherein third 
parties play a role in copyright litigation, III.B then looks at some of the 
current doctrinal hurdles that serve as impediments to such arrangements.  
 
A. Possible Forms of Third-Party Involvement in Copyright Litigation 
 
As noted earlier, the “market for copyright claims” need not always 
involve an outright purchase of the actionable claim by a third party.113 All that 
it entails, as used here, is the process by which a third party acquires some 
degree of control over the copyright litigation by funding a primary litigating 
party, and through which the third party hopes to obtain a net benefit when the 
litigation ends. Arrangements short of outright sales are thus equally effective 
market mechanisms. 
 
1. Assignments of the Right to Sue for Infringement 
 
The most obvious market mechanism involving actionable copyright 
claims is likely to be instances where the third party acquires the claim as an 
asset from the plaintiff in return for valuable consideration.114 It is important to 
understand that in this arrangement, the third party obtains no interest 
whatsoever in the actual copyrighted work itself, i.e., it obtains no interest in 
the exclusive rights obtained by the original copyright holder under the 
copyright system. The third party merely obtains the unenumerated right to 
commence an action for copyright infringement either generally, or against 
defendants specified in the arrangement. The assignment can be prospective, 
i.e., for yet-to-occur infringements, or retroactive, i.e., for already accrued 
instances of infringement.115 
In ordinary assignments of actionable claims, the original litigant drops 
out of the picture altogether and the assignee thereafter commences (or 
                                                            
113 See text accompanying notes __-__. 
114 See generally Walter Wheeler Cook, The Alienability of Choses in Action, 29 HARV. L. REV. 816 
(1916); Percy H. Winfield, Assignment of Choses of Action in Relation to Maintenance and Champerty, 
35 L.Q. REV. 143 (1919).  
115 For a useful overview of copyright law’s treatment of retroactive transfers, see James K. Rothstein, 
Note, Unilateral Settlements and Retroactive Transfers: A Problem of Copyright Ownership, 157 U. PA. 
L. REV. 881 (2009). 
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continues) the litigation in its own name against the defendant.116 For this to 
work, it is thus essential that the law allow a third party assignee to bring the 
action in its own name without imposing onerous standing requirements on the 
third party, which render the acquisition meaningless. Courts today are divided 
on whether copyright law allows third parties to bring infringement actions 
when they acquire the bare right to sue—a factor that is likely to inhibit the 
early development of this arrangement.117 
Assignments provide obvious advantages over most other forms of 
arrangements, for third parties. They give the third party complete control and 
autonomy over the litigation and settlement processes, since the original 
plaintiff drops out of the picture. They also allow the third party to itself 
alienate (or re-assign) the claim to another third party should it need to, 
without any restrictions at all. Assignments are also the most beneficial 
arrangement from an information-sharing perspective. With the court and the 
public easily obtaining information about the third party’s direct involvement 
in the claim, the sorting and classification advantages discussed earlier are 
much more likely to be realized.118 
 
2. Non-Recourse Financing of Infringement Lawsuits 
 
Instead of acquiring the lawsuit as an actionable claim from the original 
plaintiff, third parties might instead choose to invest in the copyright 
infringement lawsuit through a financing arrangement. In other forms of 
litigation, such financing is normally done through a non-recourse loan, under 
which the plaintiff accepts no personal liability for repayment, and satisfaction 
of the debt (i.e., the loan) is to occur exclusively through the proceeds from the 
litigation—either the judgment award or the settlement.119 Unlike in an 
assignment, the original plaintiff continues to remain a part of the litigation 
since the lawsuit continues in its name. The third-party funder would 
nonetheless come to exert a good degree of control over the litigation process 
and strategy through a contractual arrangement with the plaintiff. 
Arrangements of this kind leave the third party funder with less control 
and autonomy over the lawsuit than in an assignment, and are likely to be seen 
                                                            
116 The law treats the assignee as the “real party in interest”. See Charles E. Clark & Robert M. Hutchins, 
The Real Party in Interest, 34 YALE L.J. 259, 262 (1924). 
117 Compare Silvers v. Sony Pic. Ent., Inc., 402 F.3d 881 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding such assignments to be 
impermissible), with Prather v. Neva Paperbacks, 410 F.2d 698 (5th Cir. 1969) (permitting such an 
assignment).  
118 See supra Section II.xx. 
119 Non-recourse funding more generally is defined as involving “[a] loan secured by the revenue of the 
project the loan intends to fund, and nothing else…[i.e., it] does not allow the bank or other lending 
institution access to the borrower's other assets in the event of default.” FARLEX FINANCIAL DICTIONARY 
xx (2012). 
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in situations where the plaintiff (and its team) have significant expertise in 
copyright litigation, which the third party funder trusts and is willing to rely 
on. In addition to needing an independent contractual arrangement on the 
question of control, these arrangements also serve the information disclosure 
function to a far lesser degree, since the role of the third party is never made 
public—and is only ever learnt of during discovery.120 As a result, the 
possibility of any ex ante sorting and signaling is diminished quite 
significantly (or indeed eliminated). Lastly, these arrangements also leave the 
third party with fewer exit options. Whereas in an assignment, the third party 
can readily alienate the claim to another party, or choose to terminate the 
litigation, in such financing arrangements, the third party has little ability to 
stop the lawsuit, and would need to find another investor to acquire the loan 
made to the plaintiff. 
Non-recourse financing of this kind is likely to be seen in copyright 
infringement lawsuits between two large commercial competitors, and less so 
in individual lawsuits where an assignment is likely to be preferred by both the 
original plaintiff and the third party.121 
 
3. Tailored Exclusive Licenses 
 
A third way that third parties might choose to be involved in the 
infringement action is unique to copyright (and patent) law. It seeks to work 
around the ambiguity surrounding the permissibility of open assignments to 
sue, by using the law’s standing requirements. The copyright statute treats an 
“exclusive license” as a transfer of copyright ownership for the purposes of the 
statute,122 and additionally allows copyright’s bundle of exclusive rights to be 
disaggregated and broken down into idiosyncratic and narrow sub-rights in 
whatever way parties choose.123 Thus, not only can the exclusive right to 
distribute the work be licensed independent of other rights, but that right itself 
can be broken down further (e.g., the exclusive right to distribute the work in 
Santa Clara County, San Jose City, California) and licensed or assigned 
independently.124 The reason this matters is because the law then confers on 
the legal or beneficial owner of “an exclusive right” the power to commence an 
action for infringement of that right.125 What this means then is that in order to 
effect a de facto assignment of the right to sue for copyright infringement to a 
                                                            
120 In the copyright context, the Righthaven episode remains a prime example. See Balganesh, Uneasy 
Case, supra note __, at __.  
121 See, e.g., Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l Inc., 49 F. 3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995). 
122 17 U.S.C. §101 (2005) (definition of “transfer of copyright ownership”). 
123 Id. at §201(d)(2). 
124 Id. at §201(d)(1). 
125 Id. at §501(b). 
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third party, the original copyright holder has to grant the third party an 
exclusive license that is artificially tailored to the market/context in which the 
infringement in occurring. This confers standing on the third party to bring the 
action in its own name, and the artificial tailoring of the license ensures that the 
original copyright owner (i.e., the licensor) has no reason to worry about the 
third party exploiting the work or doing anything other than bringing the 
infringement action. This is best illustrated through an example.  
Assume that Jonathan is a first-time novelist based in New York City 
who self-publishes his book The Seasons in hardback on October 1, 2010 and 
begins marketing it shortly thereafter. He retains all the rights to his work. On 
January 1, 2011 Jonathan learns that a publisher located in Cambridge, MA has 
begun making paperback copies of his book and distributing them without his 
permission. Jonathan wants to bring an action against the publisher, and is 
approached by TF Inc., a litigation funder, on June 1, 2011. Instead of an 
assignment of the bare right to sue—which is of questionable validity—
Jonathan grants TF an “exclusive license to reproduce The Seasons in 
paperback book form in Cambridge, MA, from January 1 to June 1, 2011”. 
This arrangement confers on TF the power to commence the lawsuit for 
copyright infringement on its own, since it is the legal owner of the right in 
question, even though the right has been chopped up along the dimensions of 
time (i.e., 6 months), geography (i.e., Cambridge, MA) and form (i.e., 
paperback). Even though TF obtains an exclusive license, the retroactive and 
limited nature of the grant render it highly unlikely (if not improbable) that TF 
will actually exploit the work by reproducing it. The effect of the exclusive 
license is thus that it operates exactly like an assignment, and is of 
unquestionable validity. 
The obvious downside to using tailored exclusive licenses instead of 
actual assignments of the actionable claim is that it requires identifying 
specific defendants by region or market, before the license is executed—i.e., 
the tailoring. An assignment of the bare right to sue on the other hand doesn't 
require such identification and can transfer the power to bring infringement 
suits against whole classes of defendants, which an exclusive license cannot. 
The exclusive license route is thus likely to be used only till such time as 
courts (and perhaps Congress) come to accept the legality of assignments of 
the right to sue for copyright infringement.126 
 
4. Assignments of the Copyright in its Entirety 
 
The most obvious way for a third party to be involved in a copyright 
infringement action is of course by acquiring the copyright in the infringed 
work in its entirety. Once properly executed, the third party becomes the new 
                                                            
126 See infra Section III.B.2. 
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owner of the copyrighted work, with the power to commence an infringement 
action.127 Much like the assignment of the actionable claim, the original owner 
exits the picture altogether, giving the third party complete control over the 
process. However, unlike in the assignment of just the claim, the original 
owner retains no rights whatsoever to continue exploiting or using the work, 
since the third party becomes the owner for all purposes. Consequently, 
assignments of the work their entirety merely in order to allow a third party to 
bring suit are likely to be somewhat rare, and occur in situations where either 
the original copyright holder obtains a large enough payout from the third 
party that renders it willing to avoid dealing in the work altogether, or the third 
party is willing to acquire the copyright seeing its potential to commence 
lawsuits against future defendants as well. 
Third parties that acquire the copyright with the sole objective of 
litigating infringement claims or licensing its use to others, resemble non-
performing entities or “patent trolls” in the area of patent law.128  The 
probabilistic and prospect-like nature of the patent right encourages this model 
in relation to patents.129 Copyright’s entitlement on the other hand, being tied 
to the specific expression in question, allows for such prospecting to a much 
lesser extent, which is likely to result in this approach to third party 
involvement being somewhat rare.130 
 
5. Fair Use Insurance 
 
The previous mechanisms all described ways by which third parties 
may come to be involved in copyright infringement litigation on the plaintiff’s 
side. Yet, as discussed earlier, third party litigation funding can come to benefit 
defendants as well.131 The principal way in which this is likely to come about 
is through a mechanism best described as fair use insurance—where the third 
party underwrites the defendant’s likelihood of succeeding in its defense of fair 
use when an infringement claim is brought. 
Situations could thus arise where a defendant being sued for copyright 
infringement raises a colorable defense of fair use. If a sufficiently robust fee 
shifting regime were put in place, the beginnings of which are already 
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contained in current law,132 third parties are likely to be willing to underwrite 
the defense by pricing the risk associated with its success (and factoring in 
their own expertise in litigating the claim) and then potentially bringing the 
defense themselves. If the premium offered by the third party for such 
underwriting is significantly lower than the settlement offer from the plaintiff 
(which is in turn likely to be lower than the amount demanded at trial), 
defendants—especially those whose existence depends on their continued 
reliance on the fair use doctrine—are likely to obtain such insurance. In due 
course, we are also likely to see variations in the coverage offered by third 
parties, correlating to the amount of control they assume over the litigation and 
settlement processes. Here, we might thus see a variety of arrangements 
materializing, which track some of the options just discussed on the plaintiff’s 
side. The third party may simply fund the defendant’s case, or instead might 
choose to take the lead in defending the claim and deciding on litigation 
strategy. What distinguishes these policies from traditional liability insurance 
is the fact that they are obtained by defendants after the litigation (or the threat 
of litigation) actually materializes, and not necessarily in advance. 
 
B. Obstacles 
 
Having a market for copyright claims take shape will however require 
more than just an attitudinal shift among participants in the copyright system, 
requiring them to see litigation as a necessary and integral part of the system 
and its functioning. It will additionally require overcoming a host of legal 
obstacles that in turn have their source in the common law, in the statutory 
language of the Copyright Act, and in judicial interpretations of the same. This 
Section explores the primary legal obstacles that a market for copyright claims 
is likely to face and suggests possible remedial fixes. This Section discusses 
two somewhat independent sets of obstacles: (i) those originating in the 
common law, and (ii) those internal to copyright law. 
 
1. Common Law Obstacles 
 
The first set of obstacles is likely to originate in a set of principles and 
doctrines that have long been known to the common law since time 
immemorial. On the face of things, it may seem as though copyright is immune 
from these principles given its statutory origins. Yet, courts routinely invoke 
the interpretive principle of “common law conformity” while interpreting the 
Copyright Act, which mandates that the statute be interpreted in line with 
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existing common law ideas and doctrine whenever possible. Should courts 
come to extend this idea in relation to transactions relating to copyright claims, 
these obstacles are likely to become real. 
 
a. The Non-assignability of Claims 
 
The alienability of actionable claims in the common law has for long 
remained a controversial topic.133 Early in the development of the law, courts 
invalidated all attempts to transfer such claims, worrying that it would result in 
courts being overburdened with contentious lawsuits, brought by disruptive 
third parties, i.e., strangers.134 Over time, the common law came to relax the 
stringency with which the prohibition was applied and enforced.135 Purely 
personal claims were still placed under the restriction, whereas non-personal 
ones came to be understood as alienable.136 Since non-personal claims survived 
the death of the original plaintiff, while personal ones were terminated (under 
the maxim actio personalis moritur cum persona), alienability came to be tied 
to the survivability of the claim.137 And paradigmatic of non-personal claims 
were indeed property claims, such as those relating to trespass and 
conversion.138 Two reasons seem to suggest that the historic common law rule 
of non-assignability is unlikely to be invoked in relation to copyright claims.  
The first reason is conceptual. Given its exclusive rights framework, 
copyright law is often thought of in terms of a property interest rather than as a 
purely personal claim. Copyright claims are thus paradigmatic of the kinds of 
claims that the common law itself came to allow assignments of in due course. 
Thus, even under the old rule, copyright claims are unlikely to be seen as non-
assignable.  
The second reason originates in the Supreme Court’s more recent 
approach to the common law rule, especially as it applies to federal statutory 
claims. The Supreme Court’s decision in Sprint Communications Co. v. APCC 
Services considered whether the common law’s general approach to non-
assignability ought to be extended to more recent statutory regimes created by 
Congress—and concluded against applying the rule.139 In Sprint, the Court was 
                                                            
133 For early work documenting the history of this development see: Walter Wheeler Cook, The 
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presented with the question of whether the assignee of a bare right to 
commence a legal claim for money, based on a provision of the 
Communications Act of 1934, had standing to commence the action.140 The 
original entitlement to sue was entirely statutory in origin, and a practice had 
emerged wherein third party enforces accumulated the claims of multiple 
parties and then through an assignment commenced actions for recovery 
(against the original defendants) in their own name.141 Despite the statutory 
nature of the right to sue, a majority the Court considered the applicability of 
the common law, but concluded that the common law itself had evolved and 
come to permit the assignability of claims as a default position—even when 
done so exclusively to bring suit. The majority thus found that the assignee had 
standing to sue.142 Sprint can thus be seen as confirming two ideas at once: (i) 
that the common law’s default position is no longer one of non-assignability, 
and (ii) that this new default (i.e., of assignability) extends to federal statutes.  
 
b. Champerty and Maintenance 
 
In addition to its rules on non-assignability, the common law developed 
specialized doctrines through which they policed (and continue to regulate) a 
third party’s involvement in bringing an actionable claim to court. The 
doctrines of “maintenance”, “champerty”, and “barratry,” serve this purpose.143 
These rules do not apply to outright transfers. Maintenance entails assisting a 
plaintiff in either bringing or defending a lawsuit when the person so providing 
the assistance “has no bona fide interest in the case”.144 Champerty is a form of 
maintenance, performed for consideration.145 Barratry is “adjudicative cheer-
leading” wherein one person encourages an action to be brought.146  
 State common law courts routinely use these doctrines to regulate 
lawsuits brought by third parties.147 They usually scrutinize the individual 
claim brought in court, to see if it is affected by the third party’s involvement. 
They either focus on the type of action being brought, or on the relationship 
between the original claimant and the investor.148 Some states for instance, 
forbid the investor from “intermeddling” in the litigation,149 others forbid third 
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parties from getting involved in cases involving specific subject matter,150 and 
yet others regulate it contextually, examining the plaintiff’s real motivations 
for commencing the action.151 
 On the face of things, it may appear as though these doctrines are 
unlikely to apply to copyright claims, given that they originate in state 
common law, while copyright disputes are always questions of federal 
statutory law. Yet, the fact of the matter is that even while copyright 
infringement lawsuits are a question of federal law, agreements that govern the 
conditions under which the lawsuit may be brought are matters of contract law 
that must of necessity be governed by state law. Federal courts have in the past 
used state common law during infringement disputes, and applied the doctrines 
of champerty and maintenance to contractual arrangements. For example, in 
Refac International, Inc. v. Lotus Developtment Corp.,152 a third party had 
acquired a 5% stake in a patent “[t]o facilitate suit in [the third party’s] name 
as plaintiff and to avoid the need for having [the original owner] named or 
brought into the suit as a co-plaintiff.153” The court found this arrangement to 
be champertous under New York state law, and invalidated the arrangement 
during an infringement lawsuit.154 
 The doctrines of champerty and maintenance remain an obstacle for 
third party involvement not just in copyright claims, but also other forms of 
litigation. Despite their having been in existence for centuries now, courts and 
scholars have struggled to find a coherent reason for their existence. Their 
principal motivation appears to be the idea that litigation is something of an 
evil that needs to avoided.155 As courts have come to recognize the absurdity of 
this idea, so too have they come to relax the stringency with which the 
doctrines of champerty and maintenance are applied.156 It is thus quite 
conceivable that in the near future, a large number of states will come to 
abandon the doctrines altogether, or at least limit their application to cases of 
truly frivolous litigation.  
 
2. Copyright Law Obstacles 
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Even if the common law’s traditional rules against assignability, and its 
doctrines of maintenance and champerty were rendered inapplicable to 
copyright infringement claims, copyright law’s internal doctrines present a 
host of additional (and direct) obstacles to the realization of a market for 
copyright claims. Three in particular stand out: (i) copyright law’s rule against 
the assignment of the right to sue—affirmed by the Ninth Circuit, (ii) 
copyright’s requirement of formalities for statutory damages, and (iii) the 
reluctance with which courts award defendants costs and attorney’s fees in 
unsuccessful infringement actions. 
 
a. The Non-Assignability of Infringement Claims 
 
Quite independent of the common law’s rules on assignment, some 
courts have interpreted the Copyright Act as precluding assignments of the 
“bare” right to sue, independent of assignments involving the underlying 
copyright itself. The Ninth Circuit’s en banc decision in Silvers v. Sony 
Pictures Entertainment, Inc. crystallized this position.157 Silvers involved a 
plaintiff who had produced a copyrighted work under the work-for-hire 
doctrine, under which ownership of all rights vested with her employer.158 On 
learning that the defendant was possibly infringing the work in question and 
realizing that her employer (i.e., the copyright owner) was unwilling to 
commence the action, she approached her employer and obtained an 
assignment of “all right, title and interest in and to claims and causes of action 
against” the named defendant and other possible infringers of the work in 
question.159 
Hearing the matter en banc, the Ninth Circuit found the assignment to 
be invalid. The court offered four reasons for its conclusion. First, it noted that 
the copyright statute vested the right to commence an infringement action only 
with the “legal or beneficial owner” of the work, which it had in turn 
circumscribed through a narrowly tailored definition.160 Second, it looked to 
the legislative history of the Act to conclude that Congress had intended the list 
of assignable rights to be exhaustive, and enumerated in the Act itself.161 
Congress’s failure to list the right to sue, in other words, implied its non-
assignability. Third, it looked to patent law, copyright’s cousin, to find that in 
patent law too, courts had historically disallowed similar assignments of the 
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mere right to sue.162 Fourth and lastly, it looked to precedent from other 
circuits that had similarly disapproved of such transfers.163  
The court’s overall reasoning in reaching its conclusion remains deeply 
problematic. In creating a set of enumerated rights and treating them as 
independently assignable, Congress was doing little more than attempting to 
simulate the basic structure of a property right. It was in the process saying 
very little about the enforceability of those enumerated rights, for which it 
needed to create an independent provision in the Copyright Act. Merely 
because the Act specifies the mechanisms by which copyright’s exclusive 
rights may be transferred or assigned need not imply that it forbade other forms 
of assignments. The simple point is that assignments of claims (even copyright 
claims) are technically not actual transfers of copyright, and therefore outside 
the scope of the statute to begin with. The Supreme Court’s opinion in Sprint, 
discussed earlier, makes this fairly clear.164 In Sprint, the Court rightly relied 
on the common law’s allowance for the assignability of claims—even when 
done so exclusively to bring suit—to find that the assignee had standing to 
sue.165 The mere fact that the statute in question—the Communications Act in 
that instance—was silent on the point, presented the Court with no problem on 
this issue. In light of this, the Ninth Circuit’s belief that a statutory scheme 
somehow had to be self-contained in all respects seems rather myopic. 
The Court’s other reasons remain equally flawed. Copyright and patent 
law derive from fundamentally different theoretical and structural rationales, 
which ought to have cautioned against the ready use of comparisons between 
the two. Indeed, even the Supreme Court has cautioned against over-reliance 
on the analogy between the two regimes.166 In choosing precedent to follow 
from other circuits, the Ninth Circuit could have easily chosen a more 
permissive precedent to follow instead of the one that it finally did. The Court 
was in the end likely motivated by the same policy concerns that have 
historically informed the common law’s rules against the assignment of claims, 
even though it masked these concerns in its formalist rhetoric.167 
Other circuits seem to adopt a different position. The Fifth Circuit, for 
instance, has adopted the position that assignments of copyright claims are 
perfectly valid, present no problems under public policy and indeed that such 
assignments comply with the the “real party in interest” rule.168 While this 
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position was framed under the 1909 Act, there seems little reason to believe 
that the 1976 Act changed it in any way or form. The Second Circuit’s position 
on the other hand remains somewhat unclear. While the majority in Silvers 
thought that the Second Circuit disallowed assignments of the bare right to 
sue,169 the dissent in that case parsed the Second Circuit’s opinions on the 
matter to come to the exact opposite conclusion and find that the Second 
Circuit in fact permitted just such an assignment and found it to confer 
standing on an assignee plaintiff.170 In short, the law seems fairly unclear on 
the permissibility of such assignments under copyright law, which in itself 
forms a major obstacle.  
Facilitating a market for copyright claims will of necessity require 
adopting a clear rule that permits assignments of the right to sue. Given the 
Supreme Court’s position in Sprint and the flawed reasoning of the Ninth 
Circuit in Silvers, there seems little reason to believe that this will be hard to 
realize. Indeed, no circuit court has revisited the issue since the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Sprint, which seems to implicitly override the interpretive 
logic of Silvers and its progeny. Were the issue to surface again, the logic and 
holding of Sprint is likely to force courts to validate such assignments, barring 
a misplaced argument that copyright law merits differential treatment. 
 
b. Formalities for Statutory Damages and Attorney’s Fees 
 
Central to facilitating the involvement of third parties in copyright 
litigation is a robust damages regime—and copyright’s provision for statutory 
damages can ideally perform that role. As noted earlier, the entry of third 
parties can form a bridge between plaintiffs who would have otherwise been 
unable to access statutory damages, and such damages.171 Additionally, a rule 
allowing courts to award a successful plaintiff its attorney’s fees (a version of 
the English rule on fee-shifting) provides third parties with a further incentive 
to fund copyright plaintiffs. Yet, under current law, the availability of both 
statutory damages and attorney’s fees depends entirely on actions undertaken 
by the copyright owner well in advance of the litigation, or indeed the third 
party’s entry into the picture. §412 of the Copyright Act renders the 
availability of these remedies (for a published work) contingent on the 
copyright owner having registered the work within three months from the first 
publication of the work, when the infringement commences before such 
publication and registration.172 In effect, the copyright owner needs to register 
the work prior to the commencement of the infringement, for statutory 
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damages and attorney’s fees to remain available.173 The legislative history 
accompanying this provision indicates that it was introduced in order to 
“induce” adherence to copyright’s formalities, once they were rendered 
optional.174 The idea was to prevent recourse to copyright’s special remedies in 
situations where the infringement had occurred prior to registration; and the 
three month duration was intended to operate as “grace period”.175  
§412 is likely to reduce—rather drastically—a third party’s willingness 
to be involved in copyright litigation, since a large majority of copyright 
owners are unlikely to register their works prior to first publication or even 
shortly thereafter. This provision is also in contrast to §411, which mandates 
that the work be registered prior to the commencement of the infringement 
action, but not necessarily before the infringement itself began.176 
In an ideal world, the stringency of §412 would be relaxed, and it 
would come to operate along the lines of §411—requiring registration prior to 
commencing the lawsuit and not earlier. Alternatively, the “grace period” 
might be extended, especially given the periodic term extensions that copyright 
law has seen over the years,177 which seem to rely on the assumption that 
creative works hold value for longer and longer periods of time. Yet, 
legislative modification of §412 is highly unlikely, especially given the 
extensive misuse of copyright’s statutory damages in recent times.178 The net 
effect of the provision and the possibility of third party funding is therefore 
likely to translate into authors (i.e., creators) who worry about high litigation 
costs and about being unable to litigate an infringement suit on their own, 
choosing to register their works voluntarily merely in order to preserve the 
option of enticing third party funders to acquire their claims in due course. In 
the short term then, §412 will serve to deter the entry of third parties into 
copyright litigation, in the medium term however it is likely to induce a greater 
number of creators to register their works hoping to entice third parties. As the 
involvement of third parties grows, and copyright owners are able to anticipate 
the kinds of claims that the market best responds to, §412 is likely to produce 
an equilibrium where works most suited to third party funding come to be 
registered. 
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c. Defendants and Cost-Shifting 
 
As discussed earlier, third party funding can come to benefit defendants 
in copyright infringement lawsuits as well—by moving the risk of litigation 
away from them through a mechanism of insurance. For this to work however, 
third parties need a somewhat strong incentive to acquire such risk. In the 
ordinary scheme of things, American law doesn’t allow courts to award a 
successful party (plaintiff or defendant) the costs of the litigation, but instead 
requires each side to bear its own costs.179 The copyright statute is however an 
exception to this. §505 of the Act gives the court “discretion” to award the 
recovery of “full costs” to a party and “reasonable attorney’s fees” to a 
successful party in an infringement lawsuit.180 On the face of things, §505 
draws no distinction between a plaintiff and defendant, as far as the court’s 
exercise of its discretion goes.181 Yet, as a historical matter, several courts 
tended to make such awards to plaintiffs rather than defendants and even 
adopted rules to this effect, which came to be known as the “dual approach”.182  
In Fogerty v. Fantasy, the Supreme Court clarified that successful 
defendants were to be treated no differently from successful plaintiffs as far as 
awards of attorney’s fees goes.183 Since it based its conclusions on the structure 
and basis for the provision as a whole (i.e., §505), there is no reason to believe 
that its logic doesn’t extend beyond attorney’s fees, to a court’s award of “full 
costs” under the same provision. Central to the Court’s conclusion was the 
recognition that defendants too needed to be given an incentive to defend 
themselves.184 It thus explicitly noted that “defendants who seek to advance a 
variety of meritorious copyright defenses should be encouraged to litigate them 
to the same extent that plaintiffs are encouraged to litigate meritorious claims 
of infringement.185” Encouraging defendants to contest the claim through 
litigation, rather than settling, was thus central to the Court—something that 
third party funding will stimulate. 
Despite the Court’s holding in Fogerty however, as a practical matter 
defendants rarely ever succeed in being awarded costs and attorney’s fees, 
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even when they are successful.186 The reason for this originates in the Court’s 
own reasoning. In order to preserve lower courts’ discretion on when to make 
such awards, the Court identified the use of factors such as “frivolousness, 
motivation, objective unreasonableness” and the ideals of “compensation and 
deterrence”.187 As a result of this observation, courts in most jurisdictions 
remain unwilling to award defendants attorney’s fees unless convinced of the 
plaintiff’s blameworthiness or culpability in bringing the suit to begin with.188 
As long as a plaintiff has a reasonable copyright claim, such culpability is in 
turn extremely hard to establish—and is usually associated with “bad faith 
motivation”, “hard-ball tactics”, or “objective unreasonableness”.189 The net 
effect is thus that both Fogerty and §505’s limited move away from the 
traditional American rule have meant very little to defendants in practice. This 
is in turn likely to put a major dampener on the role that third party funding 
can play for defendants.  
Overcoming this obstacle is entirely up to courts—and requires treating 
the fair use defense as something that the plaintiff ought to factor into its 
decision whether to bring the infringement suit to begin with. Some courts 
already take this position and remain willing to find fault with the plaintiffs 
when the defendant has a valid fair use defense.190 They thus treat a plaintiff’s 
insistence on pursuing a claim when the defendant has a valid fair use defense, 
as objectively unreasonable and potentially frivolous.191 To be sure, not all 
courts take this position, and indeed some view a defendant’s risk-taking (by 
copying) as necessitating that it bear its own costs and expenses.192 A welcome 
change would thus be a uniform rule that treats a defendant’s colorable fair use 
defense—when ascertainable in advance—as a basis for invoking §505 and 
requiring the plaintiff to bear the defendant’s litigation costs. In some ways, 
this approach derives support from the very structure of the copyright owner’s 
(i.e., the plaintiff’s) basic entitlement, under which the set of exclusive rights is 
“subject to” the fair use defense (among other exceptions), to begin with.193 
Some scholars have used this language to suggest that the plaintiff ought to 
bear the burden of establishing that the defendant’s use isn’t a fair use to begin 
                                                            
186 See 4 NIMMER, supra note __, at §14.10[D][2][b] (“[M]ost courts deny fees to prevailing defendants 
when the plaintiffs' claims were not motivated by bad faith.”). 
187 510 U.S. 517 at 534 n.19. 
188 4 NIMMER, supra note __, at §14.10[D][2][b]. 
189 Id. 
190 See, e.g., Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., Copyright L. Rep. (CCH), P28,824 (C.D. Cal. 
2004), at 3-9. 
191 Id. 
192 See, e.g., Blanch v. Koons, 485 F. Supp. 2d 516, 518 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
193 17 U.S.C. §106 (2005). 
COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT MARKETS                                  42 
 
with.194 At the very least though, the plaintiff ought to bear the risk of 
incurring the other side’s litigation costs, even if not the actual burden of 
establishing the absence of fair use.195  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The copyright system is today in a state of deep crisis. In its current 
form, it seems to be imposing enormous costs on society, with its limited 
benefits flowing to a small minority of creators and users. And yet, attempts to 
reform the system remain largely unwilling to think creatively to bring about 
fundamental change. In specific, the possibility that solutions to some of the 
system’s problems can come from the market, rather than from doctrinal 
reform, remains largely unexplored. In this Essay, I have argued that 
facilitating a regulated market for copyright infringement claims, where third 
parties can acquire or invest in, infringement or fair use claims in court, might 
make the system more egalitarian, less inefficient, and likely to thereby serve 
its goals of inducing creativity. Accepting this, of course, requires recognizing 
that litigation isn’t an unavoidable reality of the copyright system, but rather a 
central analytical and functional part of how it works, something that scholars 
and courts have thus far resisted.  
Once litigation is seen as part of the solution rather than as part of the 
problem, harnessing the resources and expertise of third parties can come to 
bring to it, can become a powerful source of reform for the system. To be sure, 
claim markets aren’t likely to solve all of copyright’s problems, many of which 
will indeed require doctrinal changes. At the very least though, it will 
recognize such markets to form a legitimate part of the conversation about 
copyright reform. 
                                                            
194 See Ned Snow, Proving Fair Use: Burden of Proof as Burden of Speech, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1781, 
1788 (2010). 
195 I bracket for the now the question of how a more robust “copyright misuse” doctrine might play into 
this analysis. The copyright misuse doctrine is today treated as an equitable defense that allows 
defendants to avoid infringement claims by showing that the plaintiff’s behavior misuses the copyright 
privilege—either by enforcing it inequitably, in an anti-competitive manner, or to the detriment of 
copyright’s safeguards. See Brett Frischmann & Dan Moylan, Evolving Common Law Doctrine of 
Copyright Misuse: A Unified Theory and Its Application to Software, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 865 
(2005); Katherine Judge, Note, Rethinking Copyright Misuse, 57 STAN. L. REV. 901 (2004). The doctrine 
is yet to fully allow defendants to counter-claim for damages. While courts certainly shouldn’t make a 
§505 recovery continent on a showing of misuse, an independent misuse claim that allows defendants to 
sue for actual damages could conceivably support the working of §505, and perhaps even replace it in the 
long run.  
